President Donald Trump announced that the US would withhold aid to Pakistan in a January 2 tweet. While conditional aid, particularly with regards to Pakistan, is part of the solution to creating a more stable region, Trump's tweet lacked any semblance of diplomacy. It also exposed his lack of understanding of the power structures in Pakistan.
Trump initially tweeted:
The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies, deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help. No more!
It's true that beginning with Pervez Musharraf in the fresh moments after the attacks of September 11, 2001, Pakistan has been playing a "double game" of sorts. While the government promises to work in tandem with the U.S. to fight terrorism, the intelligence service, ISI, and the military have trained and funded terrorist groups.
Trump is not only wrong when he says Pakistan has given the U.S. nothing, his statement is impolitic. Pakistani soldiers have fought terrorist groups such as the TTP in remote areas in which the US military is unwilling to engage. They've provided the US with logistic support. They have turned over some members of al Qaeda. Trump's statement calling out Pakistan's "lies" ignores the country's support in the fight against terrorists in the region.
Whether led by Musharraf, Asif Ali Zardari, or Nawaz Sharif, the Pakistani government has been ineffectual and less powerful than the military and the ISI. So Pakistan isn't so much playing a double game as it possesses different power centers with competing interests.
The military and the ISI have two primary goals: combating India and instituting a policy of strategic depth in Afghanistan. The purpose of training and funding terrorist groups is to create instability and weakness in India. However, these groups' ideology isn't limited to anti-Indian sentiment. Some are also anti-Western, an unfortunate reality of ISI's anti-India campaign. Pakistan most closely aligns with the ethnic Pashtuns of Afghanistan. Pashtuns inhabit both sides of the border with Afghanistan. The most powerful Pashtun group is the Taliban. Thus, Pakistan has had a hard time distancing itself fully from the Taliban since the group ensures a Pakistani ally on its western border. The military's biggest fear is a pro-Indian government in Afghanistan.
Conditional aid in Pakistan could be an effective policy. Previous US administrations have felt that the alliance is more positive than negative despite the unfortunate reality that some US aid to Pakistan will indirectly be funneled to terrorist groups. If Trump disagrees, then the US could withhold military aid and instead tie aid to the strengthening of the government and the implementation of the rule of law.
One downside to providing conditional aid to Pakistan is that we don't live in a vacuum. China and Pakistan have fostered a close relationship since the 1960s and Pakistan will simply turn to their neighbors for aid in the absence of support from the US. It may also leave room for Russia to widen its net of influence.
Trump's policy of conditional aid to Pakistan is a good idea, but it has its pitfalls. It must be part of a larger approach and undertaken with a delicate touch as to not push Pakistan away from the US and into the arms of China and Russia. However, Trump's aggressive tweet has shattered the hope tactful diplomacy. Instead, the tweet provoked outrage. The result has been waning American influence within Pakistan. The best course for Trump in the short term is to backtrack and apologize.
Showing posts with label Pakistan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pakistan. Show all posts
Wednesday, January 10, 2018
Monday, June 22, 2009
Supporting the Alternative
Former Zambian President Frederick Chiluba is standing trial for stealing his country's money. In 1991, Chiluba represented hope for a democratic Zambia. As the leader of a trade union, he challenged Kenneth Kaunda, a man who had ruled Zambia for the 27 years since independence, for the presidency. When Chiluba won the election, he was championed by the West as one of the leaders of a new African wind of change.
But Chiluba's reign was marred with abuse of power from the outset. The opposition boycotted the 1996 presidential contest. Only strong opposition prevented Chiluba from defying the constitution and running for a third term. While it seems like Chiluba did steal money from his nation's treasury, at the very least, he spent tons of money on personal luxury goods. In the case of Zambia, the alternative did not provide progress. Chiluba was simply supported because he was the alternative to Kaunda's 27 year rule. Not because of his own credentials.
Now, the fear is that the West will back Mir-Hossein Mousavi in Iran against Mahmoud Ahmadienjad simply because Mousavi is the alternative to the confrontational incumbent. Ahmadinejad recently won a dubious election and Mousavi has vowed to fight the result, leading to mass protests against the election process. However, regardless of the name of the president, Ayatollah Khamenei will hold power in Iran, so a push to enter into the realm of Iran's domestic politics would be far riskier than any potential rewards for the U.S.
In Pakistan, the U.S. has entertained the idea of backing Nawaz Sharif for short-sided reasons. Sharif is an alternative to the seemingly-ineffective Asif Ali Zardari, with national appeal and ties to Islamists. Ironically, the U.S. had backed Zardari's late wife Benazir Bhutto simply because she was an alternative to Pervez Musharraf, who had duped the U.S. into giving billions of dollars of aid that went to the military and then to extremists. As you may have guessed the irony does not end there; Musharraf took power in a coup, overthrowing Sharif, and was viewed as a positive alternative to the corrupt Prime Minister.
While short-sided support of the alternative in Pakistan has resulted in a ridiculous merry-go-round of regime change, the policy has not worked much better elsewhere. There are numerous examples of the West and, specifically the U.S., supporting the lesser of two evils only to be wrong in the long run.
But Chiluba's reign was marred with abuse of power from the outset. The opposition boycotted the 1996 presidential contest. Only strong opposition prevented Chiluba from defying the constitution and running for a third term. While it seems like Chiluba did steal money from his nation's treasury, at the very least, he spent tons of money on personal luxury goods. In the case of Zambia, the alternative did not provide progress. Chiluba was simply supported because he was the alternative to Kaunda's 27 year rule. Not because of his own credentials.
Now, the fear is that the West will back Mir-Hossein Mousavi in Iran against Mahmoud Ahmadienjad simply because Mousavi is the alternative to the confrontational incumbent. Ahmadinejad recently won a dubious election and Mousavi has vowed to fight the result, leading to mass protests against the election process. However, regardless of the name of the president, Ayatollah Khamenei will hold power in Iran, so a push to enter into the realm of Iran's domestic politics would be far riskier than any potential rewards for the U.S.
In Pakistan, the U.S. has entertained the idea of backing Nawaz Sharif for short-sided reasons. Sharif is an alternative to the seemingly-ineffective Asif Ali Zardari, with national appeal and ties to Islamists. Ironically, the U.S. had backed Zardari's late wife Benazir Bhutto simply because she was an alternative to Pervez Musharraf, who had duped the U.S. into giving billions of dollars of aid that went to the military and then to extremists. As you may have guessed the irony does not end there; Musharraf took power in a coup, overthrowing Sharif, and was viewed as a positive alternative to the corrupt Prime Minister.
While short-sided support of the alternative in Pakistan has resulted in a ridiculous merry-go-round of regime change, the policy has not worked much better elsewhere. There are numerous examples of the West and, specifically the U.S., supporting the lesser of two evils only to be wrong in the long run.
Wednesday, March 25, 2009
The Wrong Horse in Pakistan
The U.S. is considering partnering up with Nawaz Shariff as Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari apparently becomes more unpopular. Shariff has already been ousted in disgrace from his position as Prime Minister twice.
After two failed stints as Pakistan's Prime Minister, the U.S. backed Benazir Bhutto before her assassination in December of 2007. It appears that the U.S. is aimed towards making a similar mistake. Shariff supported the Taliban, tested a nuclear bomb, and never attempted to stop the ISI's support of militants within Pakistan's borders. Shariff's government was mired in corruption. There is little to justify partnering with Shariff. He might be the man of the hour, but it would be dangerously short-sided to grant him any support.
Some feel Shariff's ties to extremist parties will allow him to reason with them. However, Shariff has already proven that he has little sway over extremists within Pakistan during his first two times in charge. He speaks the language of Islamic fundamentalism to garner support, but he lacks credibility in those circles. The fundamentalists back Shariff and Shariff throws overtures to them as both sides play each other in an effort to gain power. The alternative for the extremists is Zardari, who is perceived as an American puppet. The other option is to fight, which they have continued to do, showing that the extremists don't put much faith in Shariff.
Shariff is exactly what the U.S. doesn't need. The U.S. needs to move away from these political has-beens, who have proven themselves unable to rule Pakistan effectively. It's time for fresh blood in the halls of power or else fresh blood will be spilled elsewhere.
Saturday, September 27, 2008
Pakistan in the First U.S. Presidential Debate
The policies of both major party candidates for the presidency of the United States with regards to Pakistan are wrong. Barack Obama advocates going after bin Laden and other high al Qaeda operatives even if they are in Pakistan. While most Americans agree with that position, it has the potential to militarize more of the Pakistani population. John McCain is in favor of continuing the same failed policy towards Pakistan that George Bush has implemented- sending enormous aid without condition, which invariably goes into the pockets of the ISI and then to militant Islamists.
Obama's plan is less dangerous than McCain's. While bin Laden has a high favorability rating in Pakistan, particularly among people who live in the NWFP, he is still a foreigner. So is the rest of al Qaeda's leadership. There could be a potential violent backlash if bin Laden is killed in Pakistan by the U.S. and bin Laden would become a martyr. But bin Laden is not the type of mythic hero to where his death would enrage Pakistanis to take up arms en masse. Pakistanis would be upset at the violation of their sovereignty, but the Pakistani government under Musharraf took advantage of U.S. aid. There is no indication that the new president, Asif Ali Zardari, can put a stop to the ISI's funding of anti-American extremist groups. So, standing up to the Pakistani government is a nice change of policy, even though it would be done in a reckless manner.
McCain wants to continue to indirectly fund al Qaeda and the Taliban by granting billions in aid to Pakistan. That money is not spent on building schools or other infrastructure projects, but instead goes straight to the military. The ISI, which is linked to the military, is then asked to find extremist groups to give a significant proportion of the aid. Pakistan funds these extremists to fight India in Kashmir and funds the Taliban to fight in Afghanistan. Pakistan does not want an Afghan government that is on friendly terms with India. The Karzai government has good relations with the Indians, which has left Pakistan surrounded. McCain's policy of keeping the status quo would result in the continued destabilization of the region.
The United States should ask the Pakistani government to go after al Qaeda, but leave other groups in the NWFP alone. Pakistan should incorporate these people into the legitimate political discourse in the country, which would pacify them and ultimately marginalize these groups because their world view is not popular within Pakistan. The U.S. should give Pakistan conditional aid, tied to projects that directly help the people of Pakistan, projects such as building schools.
Obama's plan is less dangerous than McCain's. While bin Laden has a high favorability rating in Pakistan, particularly among people who live in the NWFP, he is still a foreigner. So is the rest of al Qaeda's leadership. There could be a potential violent backlash if bin Laden is killed in Pakistan by the U.S. and bin Laden would become a martyr. But bin Laden is not the type of mythic hero to where his death would enrage Pakistanis to take up arms en masse. Pakistanis would be upset at the violation of their sovereignty, but the Pakistani government under Musharraf took advantage of U.S. aid. There is no indication that the new president, Asif Ali Zardari, can put a stop to the ISI's funding of anti-American extremist groups. So, standing up to the Pakistani government is a nice change of policy, even though it would be done in a reckless manner.
McCain wants to continue to indirectly fund al Qaeda and the Taliban by granting billions in aid to Pakistan. That money is not spent on building schools or other infrastructure projects, but instead goes straight to the military. The ISI, which is linked to the military, is then asked to find extremist groups to give a significant proportion of the aid. Pakistan funds these extremists to fight India in Kashmir and funds the Taliban to fight in Afghanistan. Pakistan does not want an Afghan government that is on friendly terms with India. The Karzai government has good relations with the Indians, which has left Pakistan surrounded. McCain's policy of keeping the status quo would result in the continued destabilization of the region.
The United States should ask the Pakistani government to go after al Qaeda, but leave other groups in the NWFP alone. Pakistan should incorporate these people into the legitimate political discourse in the country, which would pacify them and ultimately marginalize these groups because their world view is not popular within Pakistan. The U.S. should give Pakistan conditional aid, tied to projects that directly help the people of Pakistan, projects such as building schools.
Tuesday, August 19, 2008
Worry Follows Musharraf's Resignation
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf resigned yesterday. Whether or not this event is truly cause for celebration depends on the direction the government takes next.
Musharraf was essentially a military dictator from the moment he took control of the country in 1999 until he relinquished his role as military chief last year. He understood the language of democracy, as he has always considered himself to be within a secular liberal tradition; however, he consistently defied the Constitution in order to maintain power.
He managed to become increasingly unpopular at home, not only because of his disregard for the Constitution, but also because of his ostensible support for the U.S. war on terror. However, the U.S. realized rather late that the ISI and the military continued to support to Taliban and Pakistani extremists even after pledging their allegiance to the U.S. Thus, while attempting to play a double game, Musharraf alienated most Pakistanis and the U.S. government at the same time.
While the resignation of a dictator is cause for celebration, any sense of optimism should be cautious. The world will focus on the next president, but the most important man regarding Pakistan's future might be military chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. He managed to keep his word by restraining the military from saving its former boss after impeachment charges were filed against the President. It would benefit Pakistan if General Kayani brought the military under civilian control. However, there is no chance of that happening. The best circumstance to hope for is that General Kayani allows the civilian government to govern unimpeded and if they fail, he allows the Pakistani people to vote them out.
The U.S. and India will want the new president, regardless of who it becomes, to go after al Qaeda, Pakistani extremists, and the Taliban. The government will probably follow in Musharraf's footsteps and continue to fight al Qaeda. Al Qaeda is viewed as a foreign source and enjoys limited popularity in Pakistan. However, it is far less politically viable for the government to target its own citizens, even those who are extremists.
The government should bring Pakistani extremists into legitimate politics. It would be political suicide for an American politician to advocate this, but it would serve to marginalize the extremists. They maintain the scant popularity they receive because of their opposition to the pro-American government and these extremists do not have another avenue to express their frustrations. So they turn to violence. While most Pakistanis are currently anti-American, few are extremists. If the extremists are legitimized yet continue to use violence, it would turn the tide of Pakistani public opinion firmly against the extremists.
Pakistan must marginalize the extremists by bringing them into legitimate arenas and the U.S. needs to help build up Pakistan's economy, instead of granting billions in aid to the military. Those are the best hopes to secure peace and stability in Pakistan and those actions will only serve to make the U.S. and India safer.
Musharraf was essentially a military dictator from the moment he took control of the country in 1999 until he relinquished his role as military chief last year. He understood the language of democracy, as he has always considered himself to be within a secular liberal tradition; however, he consistently defied the Constitution in order to maintain power.
He managed to become increasingly unpopular at home, not only because of his disregard for the Constitution, but also because of his ostensible support for the U.S. war on terror. However, the U.S. realized rather late that the ISI and the military continued to support to Taliban and Pakistani extremists even after pledging their allegiance to the U.S. Thus, while attempting to play a double game, Musharraf alienated most Pakistanis and the U.S. government at the same time.
While the resignation of a dictator is cause for celebration, any sense of optimism should be cautious. The world will focus on the next president, but the most important man regarding Pakistan's future might be military chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. He managed to keep his word by restraining the military from saving its former boss after impeachment charges were filed against the President. It would benefit Pakistan if General Kayani brought the military under civilian control. However, there is no chance of that happening. The best circumstance to hope for is that General Kayani allows the civilian government to govern unimpeded and if they fail, he allows the Pakistani people to vote them out.
The U.S. and India will want the new president, regardless of who it becomes, to go after al Qaeda, Pakistani extremists, and the Taliban. The government will probably follow in Musharraf's footsteps and continue to fight al Qaeda. Al Qaeda is viewed as a foreign source and enjoys limited popularity in Pakistan. However, it is far less politically viable for the government to target its own citizens, even those who are extremists.
The government should bring Pakistani extremists into legitimate politics. It would be political suicide for an American politician to advocate this, but it would serve to marginalize the extremists. They maintain the scant popularity they receive because of their opposition to the pro-American government and these extremists do not have another avenue to express their frustrations. So they turn to violence. While most Pakistanis are currently anti-American, few are extremists. If the extremists are legitimized yet continue to use violence, it would turn the tide of Pakistani public opinion firmly against the extremists.
Pakistan must marginalize the extremists by bringing them into legitimate arenas and the U.S. needs to help build up Pakistan's economy, instead of granting billions in aid to the military. Those are the best hopes to secure peace and stability in Pakistan and those actions will only serve to make the U.S. and India safer.
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