The strikes against Libya might seem like a noble endeavor taken up by the United States and its allies to aid freedom-seeking rebels determined to rid themselves from the shackles of Gaddafi's authoritarianism. But the consequences will be detrimental to Libya and its people.
In the short term, the strikes have effectively pushed fence sitters into Gaddafi's camp. The West truly is invading. Gaddafi's decades-long claims that he was a pillar against the West's neo-imperialist interests are coming true. He has instantly gained credibility.
Should the U.S. enable regime change to occur, the prospects of a peace in a post-Gaddafi Libya has been compromised. No longer can the Libyan rebels claim that they own the overthrow of Gaddafi. Gaddafi's ouster wouldn't be determined by the will of the people, but would be precipitated by the West's invasion. Thus, should the rebel leaders take over, their legitimacy would be seriously compromised. As a result, Libya is likely to see violence in order to control its oil reserves for many years to come.
But the ill-advised war in Libya is not the only error the U.S. government committed this week. The House rejected a vote to withdraw troops from Afghanistan by the end of the year instead of starting the withdrawal in 2014 (H. Con. Res. 28). In fact, only 93 representatives voted to end the war, which remains a pointless stalemate.
Showing posts with label Afghanistan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Afghanistan. Show all posts
Tuesday, March 22, 2011
Thursday, December 10, 2009
Additional U.S. Troops Headed to Afghanistan
Adding 30,000 additional U.S. troops to the war in Afghanistan is a mistake. First, it must be understood that the Taliban poses no threat to overtake the country once again.
The Taliban was able to capture 90% of the country at the beginning of the decade, before the American invasion. While they were able to enforce some outrageous laws in some high-profile places, they ruled most of the country in name only. The Taliban did not and will never truly rule over the majority of Afghanistan. They have some pull in the south of the country and the U.S. occupation has done nothing to diminish the Taliban's popularity in the Pashtun heartland. But most people in Herat and Kabul will always resent their presence. In Hazarajat and in the north, the Taliban will always be mortal enemies. The concern that the Taliban will sweep through the country if and when the U.S. leaves is unfounded.
The best case scenario for Afghanistan is for each distinct region to have its own system of government and to be loosely affiliated with one another. In this case, the best one can hope for, the Taliban would likely have some power in the south. Individual warlords would probably control the other regions of the country. Tax revenue would be collected and distributed locally. Individual regions would be allowed to determine how leaders are selected. The hope is that these warlords would be satisfied to hold onto power within their own areas and would refrain from engaging in violent forays into other regions in a bid to increase power. A central government may have some oversight powers, but, realistically, would likely end up being no more than the government of Kabul.
The U.S.'s intended goals however are to attempt to create a stable nation and turn over power to the Afghan government. This government, run by Hamid Karzai, is illegitimate on the heels of the stolen election held in August. Yet the U.S. plan is totally dependent on a government that has no credibility and has been widely regarded as ineffective and even corrupt. The U.S. has not only failed to learn the lessons of recent Afghan history, but those of ancient history as well. It continues to attempt to impose a strong central government on a society that has rejected its presence for thousands of years. The U.S. is pursuing a policy in Afghanistan that has no chance of success.
One concern is that if Afghanistan crumbles, Pakistan will follow. Unfortunately, Afghanistan crumbled thirty years ago, so that fear is outdated. In addition, Pakistani distrust of the U.S. pushes even moderate Pakistanis to the side of radical fundamentalists in opposition to the U.S. Should the U.S. military leave the region, it would likely increase the Pakistanis resolve to fight certain radical groups, because those groups would no longer serve their purpose as anti-U.S. forces. Pakistanis would perceive the fate of their nation to be at stake. So, in reality, the health of Pakistan might very well depend on a U.S. withdrawal.
The Taliban was able to capture 90% of the country at the beginning of the decade, before the American invasion. While they were able to enforce some outrageous laws in some high-profile places, they ruled most of the country in name only. The Taliban did not and will never truly rule over the majority of Afghanistan. They have some pull in the south of the country and the U.S. occupation has done nothing to diminish the Taliban's popularity in the Pashtun heartland. But most people in Herat and Kabul will always resent their presence. In Hazarajat and in the north, the Taliban will always be mortal enemies. The concern that the Taliban will sweep through the country if and when the U.S. leaves is unfounded.
The best case scenario for Afghanistan is for each distinct region to have its own system of government and to be loosely affiliated with one another. In this case, the best one can hope for, the Taliban would likely have some power in the south. Individual warlords would probably control the other regions of the country. Tax revenue would be collected and distributed locally. Individual regions would be allowed to determine how leaders are selected. The hope is that these warlords would be satisfied to hold onto power within their own areas and would refrain from engaging in violent forays into other regions in a bid to increase power. A central government may have some oversight powers, but, realistically, would likely end up being no more than the government of Kabul.
The U.S.'s intended goals however are to attempt to create a stable nation and turn over power to the Afghan government. This government, run by Hamid Karzai, is illegitimate on the heels of the stolen election held in August. Yet the U.S. plan is totally dependent on a government that has no credibility and has been widely regarded as ineffective and even corrupt. The U.S. has not only failed to learn the lessons of recent Afghan history, but those of ancient history as well. It continues to attempt to impose a strong central government on a society that has rejected its presence for thousands of years. The U.S. is pursuing a policy in Afghanistan that has no chance of success.
One concern is that if Afghanistan crumbles, Pakistan will follow. Unfortunately, Afghanistan crumbled thirty years ago, so that fear is outdated. In addition, Pakistani distrust of the U.S. pushes even moderate Pakistanis to the side of radical fundamentalists in opposition to the U.S. Should the U.S. military leave the region, it would likely increase the Pakistanis resolve to fight certain radical groups, because those groups would no longer serve their purpose as anti-U.S. forces. Pakistanis would perceive the fate of their nation to be at stake. So, in reality, the health of Pakistan might very well depend on a U.S. withdrawal.
Wednesday, August 19, 2009
The 2009 Afghan Presidential Election
The context: Afghanistan enters the presidential election, scheduled for August 20, as a war-torn and divided nation. Afghans, in general, tend to put other features of their identity over that of nationalism, whether they be tribal, ethnic, or sectarian. According to scholars, waves of nationalism appear only fleetingly in the wake of a foreign invasion. This makes it difficult for any national leader to appeal to the citizenry's patriotism to unify the country around him- or herself.
After a near-ten-year long Soviet occupation of the country, Afghanistan saw civil war. Eventually, the Taliban would overrun various disorganized warlords, who only entered into a loose collaboration called the Northern Alliance when the situation became dire, and control approximately 90% of the country. The Taliban, a mostly nihilistic organization adept at the politics of military conquest, was filled with a few anti-Soviet ex-mujahideen leaders, semi-educated students from radical madrasas located in Pakistan, and incorporated local Pashtun fighters, instituted harsh social controls in certain areas within its domain.
Following the attacks against the U.S. on September 11, 2001 by al Qaeda, an international terrorist organization headquartered in Afghanistan with the support of the Taliban, the U.S. invaded Afghanistan and attacked the Taliban after years of neglect in the region following the end of the Cold War. The U.S. pursued a policy of supporting the warlords, many of whom found themselves in high-ranking positions in the newly-created U.S.-backed government. The U.S. refused to negotiate or compromise with the ousted Taliban and they have remained outside the parameters of legal politics.
The election: Dozens of candidates are running for Afghanistan's highest political position. However, there are only four serious contenders for the job, incumbent Hamid Karzai, Ashraf Ghani, Ramazan Bashardost, and Abdullah Abdullah. If no one wins 50% of the vote in the first round, the top two candidates will engage in a run-off. The Taliban has threatened to disrupt the voting with violence. Some Afghans believe that, even if the vote occurs in relative peace, foreign powers will manipulate the results. Internal fraud is also a concern. Western nations have more than 100,000 troops in the country.
The polls: (While the accuracy of any political poll should always be questioned, in Afghanistan, these numbers should be taken with a grain of salt.)
International Republican Institute - May 3-16:
Karzai 31%, Abdullah 7, Ghani 3, Bashardost 3.
International Republican Institute - July 6-16:
Karzai 44%, Abdullah 26, Bashardost 10, Ghani 6.
Glevum Associates - July 8-17:
Karzai 36%, Abdullah 20, Bashardost 7, Ghani 3.
The candidates:
Hamid Karzai: Hamid Karzai, the incumbent president, is running on his achievements while in office. He notes that Afghanistan’s budget revenue and per-capita income has risen during his reign. He proposes to include the Taliban in a loya jirga to negotiate a peace deal. He claims that Taliban violence is incited by invasive searches conducted by Western troops into the homes of Afghans.
Karzai, a Pashtun, served in parliament during the rule of King Zahir Shah. After the Soviet invasion, he joined the resistance as a diplomat and advisor. After the collapse of the communist regime, he was deputy foreign minister from 1992-1994. At that point, the Taliban entered the equation and began winning military victories.
Karzai initially supported the Taliban, but broke with the movement over concerns of too much foreign influence in the form of Arab radicals. Thus, Karzai turned down the Taliban's offer to become their Ambassador to the UN and moved to Pakistan in 1995. In 1999, after the Taliban assassinated his father, Karzai became the leader of the Popolzai tribe, which boasts a half-million people. After the 2001 U.S. invasion, Karzai led the only Pastun anti-Taliban resistance operating from within Afghanistan. That gave him credence in the eyes of the U.S.
With U.S. backing, Karzai headed the new Afghan government in 2001 and officially rose to the position of president in 2002. He was elected to a five-year term in 2004. Once the darling of the U.S., Karzai has fallen out of favor with the West of late. The West criticizes him for weak leadership, making deals with warlords, tolerating drug smugglers, and ignoring corruption. His younger brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, is allegedly involved with the drug trade, but denies it. In April, Hamid Karzai pardoned five convicted drug smugglers. However, Karzai has never personally been accused of corruption. The West also blames him for the resurgence of the Taliban and his Taliban reconciliation program is barely functioning. However, it should be noted that the invasion of Iraq distracted the U.S. away from the problems of Afghanistan.
In the north, people complain of lack of water, power, and jobs, while, in the south, people's biggest concern is violence. Despite these concerns, Karzai is still widely popular and remains the front runner. His support base is located in the Pastun south, particularly in Kandahar. He has managed to add to his support by forming alliances with regional power brokers and buying support among other potential challengers. The possible Taliban violence in the south could hamper Karzai's election fortunes if his supporters choose not to turnout over security concerns.
During the campaign, Karzai stayed out of the public eye until late July. He refused to attend a presidential debate held on July 23. He was accused of not being able to defend his policies. Karzai questioned the neutrality of the television channel airing the debate. One of his running mates, Mohammad Qasim Fahim, who was a military leader for the Northern Alliance, survived an assassination attempt in July. Karzai's ties to General Rashid Dostum, who originally fought for the communist government before leading his own militia, has drawn criticism because Dostum is accused of war crimes. Dostum recently returned from exile, threatening to withhold the support of his followers for Karzai if he wasn't allowed to come back.
Abdullah Abdullah: Dr. Abdullah Abdullah is the candidate for the largest opposition bloc, the National Front. He is calling for the devolution away from power of the presidency and the institution of a parliamentary system. He advocates the election of local officials, who are now appointed by the president, claiming that the appointments have led to corruption, particularly among governors. He vows to curb corruption and will review foreign assistance programs so that they focus on grass roots development and address poverty and unemployment. He has emphasized the rights of the unemployed, women, disabled, and victims of the wars in his campaign.
While Abdullah promises to work towards reconciliation with the Taliban, he does not believe that Mullah Omar, its leader, would be willing to negotiate. Instead, Abdullah would take a grassroots approach to stopping the Taliban through councils to address the grievances of the people, asserting that the government's inability to meet the needs of its constituency increases the popularity of the Taliban. He has called for a decreased role for the UN, saying that it should only coordinate foreign affairs, not dictate internal Afghan affairs, but should also help implement the government's programs.
Abdullah Abdullah, who is ethnically half-Pashtun and half-Tajik, achieved his degree in Ophthalmology from Kabul University. He later fought to resist Soviet and then Taliban rule. After the U.S. invasion, Abdullah became foreign minister under Karzai, a position he held from 2001-2006, leaving because he was critical of Karzai's policies. Recently, he has accused Karzai of utilizing a strategy of divide and rule, polarizing the nation.
Abdullah, who started his campaign late, draws his support largely from Afghanistan's Tajiks. He asserts that he can make inroads into gaining the Pashtun vote, but most critics believe that is doubtful. He can count on support from large population centers, particularly in the north. He is considered the northern candidate. His strong hold is the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif. Shiite clerics in Herat, who supported Karzai in 2004, are now backing Abdullah. On August 13, one of his most prominent supporters, former president Burhanuddin Rabbani (who ruled from 1992-1996, one of only two instances a non-Pashtun ruled modern Afghanistan), escaped an ambush. Abdullah is the only candidate of the major four who did not attend the second presidential debate.
While Abdullah is trying to capture the legacy of Ahmed Shah Masoud, a popular Tajik warlord who was assassinated by al Qaeda in 2001, critics claim Abdullah is too close to the Northern Alliance, which has been accused of war crimes. Ashraf Ghani has also criticized his parliamentary prerogative, claiming that the country can't afford wasting time on redividing power. Historically, Afghanistan's leaders have shied away from a parliamentary system of government beginning with Amir Abdul Rahman Khan, and including Mullah Omar and Hamid Karzai.
Ashraf Ghani: Ashraf Ghani promises to curb corruption. He would require 3,000 civilian and military leaders to disclose their assets. He would link the salaries of civil servants to growth in state revenue and the decline in corruption. He has called for reform of the judicial system. Ghani hopes to create a million jobs and a million houses. He is focusing on improving education by building more mosques, madrasas and universities, particularly those for women, because there are currently more students than the universities can handle.
In dealing with the Taliban, he advocates a grassroots approach to stopping the Taliban through councils to address the grievances of the people, then negotiating a ceasefire prior to reconciliation. Only after a ceasefire is in place should the government engage in political negotiations with the Taliban. Ghani believes the recent increase in U.S. troops is necessary because of the neglect of former U.S. president, George W. Bush. Ghani has called for better coordination between Afghan and internal forces. He vows to close the U.S. detention center at Bagram as a part of his policy to close all international detention centers within three years.
Ashraf Ghani, who is a Pashtun, has spent 24 years of his life abroad. He studied at the American University of Beirut in the 1970s. He achieved a doctorate in Anthropology from Columbia University in 1982. He later taught at Johns Hopkins University. Beginning in 1991, Ghani worked at the World Bank as a development specialist. He was appointed finance minister by Hamid Karzai in 2002 and held that position until 2004. While finance minister, Ghani instituted a centralized revenue collection scheme that received praise. He left the cabinet because of disillusionment with official corruption and Karzai's leadership.
Ghani has accused Karzai of using state resources to promote the latter's campaign. He has railed against Karzai's backroom dealings. He also believes the Afghan police force has cost a lot of money with little to show for it. But because of Ghani's extensive time living in the West, he is criticized as the candidate of the West. Ghani repeatedly argues that he has intimate knowledge of the Afghan village. Some Afghan colleagues have called him confrontational, condescending, and aloof. To combat the criticisms and aid his campaign in general, he hired the American political consultant, James Carville.
Ramazan Bashardost: Ramazan Bashardost has been credited with championing the cause of the poor during his campaign. He calls for clean government and plays down ethnic affiliation. He claims the Taliban are not fighting the Americans, but are still engaged in the violent struggle for power stemming from the 1990s. He advises the Americans to refrain from worrying about security and instead suggests they worry about their billions of dollars going to Afghan politicians. He asserts that the Taliban are not ready to negotiate for peace.
Bashardost is ethnically Hazara and a Shiite. He lived in France for two decades and achieved a doctorate in law. He was a planning minister under Hamid Karzai from 2004-2005. He left the cabinet after calling for stricter accountability for money going to local and international aid agencies. As minister, Bashardost donated his salary to pay for the lunches of his aids. He has subsequently criticized Karzai for giving perks to other ministers, including $60,000 cars and land plots. After leaving the cabinet in 2005, he was promptly elected as a Member of Parliament. He is still an MP.
Bashardost has been running a populist campaign. He has been living in a tent across the street from parliament in protest of government corruption. The tent also serves as his campaign headquarters. Bashardost, who has never been married, has refused government bodyguards. He draws his support from the urban protest vote and the province of Hazarjat. His critics believe his actions against corruption are genuine, but assert that he's more of a moralist leader as opposed to a political one. He often rants, leaving his policy prescriptions murky.
After a near-ten-year long Soviet occupation of the country, Afghanistan saw civil war. Eventually, the Taliban would overrun various disorganized warlords, who only entered into a loose collaboration called the Northern Alliance when the situation became dire, and control approximately 90% of the country. The Taliban, a mostly nihilistic organization adept at the politics of military conquest, was filled with a few anti-Soviet ex-mujahideen leaders, semi-educated students from radical madrasas located in Pakistan, and incorporated local Pashtun fighters, instituted harsh social controls in certain areas within its domain.
Following the attacks against the U.S. on September 11, 2001 by al Qaeda, an international terrorist organization headquartered in Afghanistan with the support of the Taliban, the U.S. invaded Afghanistan and attacked the Taliban after years of neglect in the region following the end of the Cold War. The U.S. pursued a policy of supporting the warlords, many of whom found themselves in high-ranking positions in the newly-created U.S.-backed government. The U.S. refused to negotiate or compromise with the ousted Taliban and they have remained outside the parameters of legal politics.
The election: Dozens of candidates are running for Afghanistan's highest political position. However, there are only four serious contenders for the job, incumbent Hamid Karzai, Ashraf Ghani, Ramazan Bashardost, and Abdullah Abdullah. If no one wins 50% of the vote in the first round, the top two candidates will engage in a run-off. The Taliban has threatened to disrupt the voting with violence. Some Afghans believe that, even if the vote occurs in relative peace, foreign powers will manipulate the results. Internal fraud is also a concern. Western nations have more than 100,000 troops in the country.
The polls: (While the accuracy of any political poll should always be questioned, in Afghanistan, these numbers should be taken with a grain of salt.)
International Republican Institute - May 3-16:
Karzai 31%, Abdullah 7, Ghani 3, Bashardost 3.
International Republican Institute - July 6-16:
Karzai 44%, Abdullah 26, Bashardost 10, Ghani 6.
Glevum Associates - July 8-17:
Karzai 36%, Abdullah 20, Bashardost 7, Ghani 3.
The candidates:
Hamid Karzai: Hamid Karzai, the incumbent president, is running on his achievements while in office. He notes that Afghanistan’s budget revenue and per-capita income has risen during his reign. He proposes to include the Taliban in a loya jirga to negotiate a peace deal. He claims that Taliban violence is incited by invasive searches conducted by Western troops into the homes of Afghans.
Karzai, a Pashtun, served in parliament during the rule of King Zahir Shah. After the Soviet invasion, he joined the resistance as a diplomat and advisor. After the collapse of the communist regime, he was deputy foreign minister from 1992-1994. At that point, the Taliban entered the equation and began winning military victories.
Karzai initially supported the Taliban, but broke with the movement over concerns of too much foreign influence in the form of Arab radicals. Thus, Karzai turned down the Taliban's offer to become their Ambassador to the UN and moved to Pakistan in 1995. In 1999, after the Taliban assassinated his father, Karzai became the leader of the Popolzai tribe, which boasts a half-million people. After the 2001 U.S. invasion, Karzai led the only Pastun anti-Taliban resistance operating from within Afghanistan. That gave him credence in the eyes of the U.S.
With U.S. backing, Karzai headed the new Afghan government in 2001 and officially rose to the position of president in 2002. He was elected to a five-year term in 2004. Once the darling of the U.S., Karzai has fallen out of favor with the West of late. The West criticizes him for weak leadership, making deals with warlords, tolerating drug smugglers, and ignoring corruption. His younger brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, is allegedly involved with the drug trade, but denies it. In April, Hamid Karzai pardoned five convicted drug smugglers. However, Karzai has never personally been accused of corruption. The West also blames him for the resurgence of the Taliban and his Taliban reconciliation program is barely functioning. However, it should be noted that the invasion of Iraq distracted the U.S. away from the problems of Afghanistan.
In the north, people complain of lack of water, power, and jobs, while, in the south, people's biggest concern is violence. Despite these concerns, Karzai is still widely popular and remains the front runner. His support base is located in the Pastun south, particularly in Kandahar. He has managed to add to his support by forming alliances with regional power brokers and buying support among other potential challengers. The possible Taliban violence in the south could hamper Karzai's election fortunes if his supporters choose not to turnout over security concerns.
During the campaign, Karzai stayed out of the public eye until late July. He refused to attend a presidential debate held on July 23. He was accused of not being able to defend his policies. Karzai questioned the neutrality of the television channel airing the debate. One of his running mates, Mohammad Qasim Fahim, who was a military leader for the Northern Alliance, survived an assassination attempt in July. Karzai's ties to General Rashid Dostum, who originally fought for the communist government before leading his own militia, has drawn criticism because Dostum is accused of war crimes. Dostum recently returned from exile, threatening to withhold the support of his followers for Karzai if he wasn't allowed to come back.
Abdullah Abdullah: Dr. Abdullah Abdullah is the candidate for the largest opposition bloc, the National Front. He is calling for the devolution away from power of the presidency and the institution of a parliamentary system. He advocates the election of local officials, who are now appointed by the president, claiming that the appointments have led to corruption, particularly among governors. He vows to curb corruption and will review foreign assistance programs so that they focus on grass roots development and address poverty and unemployment. He has emphasized the rights of the unemployed, women, disabled, and victims of the wars in his campaign.
While Abdullah promises to work towards reconciliation with the Taliban, he does not believe that Mullah Omar, its leader, would be willing to negotiate. Instead, Abdullah would take a grassroots approach to stopping the Taliban through councils to address the grievances of the people, asserting that the government's inability to meet the needs of its constituency increases the popularity of the Taliban. He has called for a decreased role for the UN, saying that it should only coordinate foreign affairs, not dictate internal Afghan affairs, but should also help implement the government's programs.
Abdullah Abdullah, who is ethnically half-Pashtun and half-Tajik, achieved his degree in Ophthalmology from Kabul University. He later fought to resist Soviet and then Taliban rule. After the U.S. invasion, Abdullah became foreign minister under Karzai, a position he held from 2001-2006, leaving because he was critical of Karzai's policies. Recently, he has accused Karzai of utilizing a strategy of divide and rule, polarizing the nation.
Abdullah, who started his campaign late, draws his support largely from Afghanistan's Tajiks. He asserts that he can make inroads into gaining the Pashtun vote, but most critics believe that is doubtful. He can count on support from large population centers, particularly in the north. He is considered the northern candidate. His strong hold is the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif. Shiite clerics in Herat, who supported Karzai in 2004, are now backing Abdullah. On August 13, one of his most prominent supporters, former president Burhanuddin Rabbani (who ruled from 1992-1996, one of only two instances a non-Pashtun ruled modern Afghanistan), escaped an ambush. Abdullah is the only candidate of the major four who did not attend the second presidential debate.
While Abdullah is trying to capture the legacy of Ahmed Shah Masoud, a popular Tajik warlord who was assassinated by al Qaeda in 2001, critics claim Abdullah is too close to the Northern Alliance, which has been accused of war crimes. Ashraf Ghani has also criticized his parliamentary prerogative, claiming that the country can't afford wasting time on redividing power. Historically, Afghanistan's leaders have shied away from a parliamentary system of government beginning with Amir Abdul Rahman Khan, and including Mullah Omar and Hamid Karzai.
Ashraf Ghani: Ashraf Ghani promises to curb corruption. He would require 3,000 civilian and military leaders to disclose their assets. He would link the salaries of civil servants to growth in state revenue and the decline in corruption. He has called for reform of the judicial system. Ghani hopes to create a million jobs and a million houses. He is focusing on improving education by building more mosques, madrasas and universities, particularly those for women, because there are currently more students than the universities can handle.
In dealing with the Taliban, he advocates a grassroots approach to stopping the Taliban through councils to address the grievances of the people, then negotiating a ceasefire prior to reconciliation. Only after a ceasefire is in place should the government engage in political negotiations with the Taliban. Ghani believes the recent increase in U.S. troops is necessary because of the neglect of former U.S. president, George W. Bush. Ghani has called for better coordination between Afghan and internal forces. He vows to close the U.S. detention center at Bagram as a part of his policy to close all international detention centers within three years.
Ashraf Ghani, who is a Pashtun, has spent 24 years of his life abroad. He studied at the American University of Beirut in the 1970s. He achieved a doctorate in Anthropology from Columbia University in 1982. He later taught at Johns Hopkins University. Beginning in 1991, Ghani worked at the World Bank as a development specialist. He was appointed finance minister by Hamid Karzai in 2002 and held that position until 2004. While finance minister, Ghani instituted a centralized revenue collection scheme that received praise. He left the cabinet because of disillusionment with official corruption and Karzai's leadership.
Ghani has accused Karzai of using state resources to promote the latter's campaign. He has railed against Karzai's backroom dealings. He also believes the Afghan police force has cost a lot of money with little to show for it. But because of Ghani's extensive time living in the West, he is criticized as the candidate of the West. Ghani repeatedly argues that he has intimate knowledge of the Afghan village. Some Afghan colleagues have called him confrontational, condescending, and aloof. To combat the criticisms and aid his campaign in general, he hired the American political consultant, James Carville.
Ramazan Bashardost: Ramazan Bashardost has been credited with championing the cause of the poor during his campaign. He calls for clean government and plays down ethnic affiliation. He claims the Taliban are not fighting the Americans, but are still engaged in the violent struggle for power stemming from the 1990s. He advises the Americans to refrain from worrying about security and instead suggests they worry about their billions of dollars going to Afghan politicians. He asserts that the Taliban are not ready to negotiate for peace.
Bashardost is ethnically Hazara and a Shiite. He lived in France for two decades and achieved a doctorate in law. He was a planning minister under Hamid Karzai from 2004-2005. He left the cabinet after calling for stricter accountability for money going to local and international aid agencies. As minister, Bashardost donated his salary to pay for the lunches of his aids. He has subsequently criticized Karzai for giving perks to other ministers, including $60,000 cars and land plots. After leaving the cabinet in 2005, he was promptly elected as a Member of Parliament. He is still an MP.
Bashardost has been running a populist campaign. He has been living in a tent across the street from parliament in protest of government corruption. The tent also serves as his campaign headquarters. Bashardost, who has never been married, has refused government bodyguards. He draws his support from the urban protest vote and the province of Hazarjat. His critics believe his actions against corruption are genuine, but assert that he's more of a moralist leader as opposed to a political one. He often rants, leaving his policy prescriptions murky.
Tuesday, February 3, 2009
Petraeus at the Super Bowl
General David Petraeus made an appearance at the Super Bowl. The contradiction between the increase in specialization in the NFL and Petraeus' job is striking. Some NFL teams have a punter, a kicker for field goals, and a kicker for kickoffs while Petraeus is the head of U.S. Central Command, which puts him in charge of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The conditions, cultures, peoples, histories, and circumstances are profoundly different in Iraq and Afghanistan. The battle to be fought is different. The way the United States needs to relate to the people in the two countries is different. Afghanistan hasn't been occupied by a foreign force for a few thousand years. The country has fallen victim to an invasion, a civil war, and now another invasion in the last thirty years. The country's infrastructure is practically nil. The U.S. overthrew a religiously Sunni fundamentalist regime. After overcoming British colonialism, Iraq eventually saw a secular strongman take over the well-developed nation. Iraq featured a burgeoning middle class and a predominately Shiite population. Afghanistan has many different ethnic groups, but the largest are the Pashtuns. Iraqis are mostly Arab. The differences are overwhelmingly endless.
If there was ever a time for specialization it should be in dealing with the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. And let's let one guy do all a team's kicking in the NFL.
The conditions, cultures, peoples, histories, and circumstances are profoundly different in Iraq and Afghanistan. The battle to be fought is different. The way the United States needs to relate to the people in the two countries is different. Afghanistan hasn't been occupied by a foreign force for a few thousand years. The country has fallen victim to an invasion, a civil war, and now another invasion in the last thirty years. The country's infrastructure is practically nil. The U.S. overthrew a religiously Sunni fundamentalist regime. After overcoming British colonialism, Iraq eventually saw a secular strongman take over the well-developed nation. Iraq featured a burgeoning middle class and a predominately Shiite population. Afghanistan has many different ethnic groups, but the largest are the Pashtuns. Iraqis are mostly Arab. The differences are overwhelmingly endless.
If there was ever a time for specialization it should be in dealing with the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. And let's let one guy do all a team's kicking in the NFL.
Tuesday, December 16, 2008
Come Home from the Mountains
The U.S. should pull all of its soldiers out of Afghanistan immediately. There is no achievable goal and thus, no logical reason to keep U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The region has not been conquered by any outside forces for thousands of years. More importantly, it will not be conquered in the near future.
As the U.S. stays in Afghanistan, the Taliban continues to be relevant. This is a group that feeds on warfare. They grew during the civil war of the 1990s, but once they controlled most of the country by the turn of the millennium, they kept fighting. The Taliban proved ineffective at governing the country and needed to continue the war in order to maintain its power. When they first came onto the scene in the mid-1990s, Afghans, particularly Pashtuns, backed the Taliban because they were seen as the best hope to bring about peace. The country soon learned that the Taliban desired anything but peace and many turned their backs on the collective. Warfare sustains the Taliban.
Afghanistan has been overwrought with warlords over the last couple of decades. During the initial invasion the U.S. allied itself with the warlords, particularly those belonging to the loose alliance known as the Northern Alliance. This strategy proved disastrous for the people of Afghanistan because it empowered the warlords, who had made their livings off of plundering and purging the populace. Much as is the case with the Taliban, war behooves the warlords because it keeps them important and powerful.
While the removal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan will not create an immediate peace within the country, it is the first step. The U.S. forces have no realistic broad aims that can be accomplished. The country will not fall in line behind President Hamid Karzai simply because the American military attempts to make it happen. Enemies of the U.S. are now often seen as protagonists. If U.S. troops are taken out of Afghanistan, the Taliban loses credibility and U.S. soldiers would no longer needlessly be in harm’s way. Many Afghans would not support the Taliban or al Qaeda but for the two organizations’ anti-Americanism. If there is no American military within Afghanistan to despise, the tide may very well turn against the Taliban and any al Qaeda members left within the Afghan borders.
As the U.S. stays in Afghanistan, the Taliban continues to be relevant. This is a group that feeds on warfare. They grew during the civil war of the 1990s, but once they controlled most of the country by the turn of the millennium, they kept fighting. The Taliban proved ineffective at governing the country and needed to continue the war in order to maintain its power. When they first came onto the scene in the mid-1990s, Afghans, particularly Pashtuns, backed the Taliban because they were seen as the best hope to bring about peace. The country soon learned that the Taliban desired anything but peace and many turned their backs on the collective. Warfare sustains the Taliban.
Afghanistan has been overwrought with warlords over the last couple of decades. During the initial invasion the U.S. allied itself with the warlords, particularly those belonging to the loose alliance known as the Northern Alliance. This strategy proved disastrous for the people of Afghanistan because it empowered the warlords, who had made their livings off of plundering and purging the populace. Much as is the case with the Taliban, war behooves the warlords because it keeps them important and powerful.
While the removal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan will not create an immediate peace within the country, it is the first step. The U.S. forces have no realistic broad aims that can be accomplished. The country will not fall in line behind President Hamid Karzai simply because the American military attempts to make it happen. Enemies of the U.S. are now often seen as protagonists. If U.S. troops are taken out of Afghanistan, the Taliban loses credibility and U.S. soldiers would no longer needlessly be in harm’s way. Many Afghans would not support the Taliban or al Qaeda but for the two organizations’ anti-Americanism. If there is no American military within Afghanistan to despise, the tide may very well turn against the Taliban and any al Qaeda members left within the Afghan borders.
Monday, October 6, 2008
A Failure to Negotiate
The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan was never anything more than a precursor to the invasion of Iraq. The U.S. was never interested in putting a halt to the cycle of violence that has doomed Afghanistan for the last three decades. The U.S. was never concerned with nation-building in Afghanistan. The U.S. never had any intention of going after Osama bin Laden. There are two pieces of evidence for these points.
U.S. policy towards Afghanistan has been utterly haphazard; the U.S. has managed to consistently do the wrong thing in Afghanistan. In addition, prominent members of the administration were so eager to deem Afghanistan a success despite evidence to the contrary and were so anxious to go to war with Iraq. Even now, Republican presidential nominee John McCain explicitly contends that Iraq is the central front of the war on terror.
In the wake of recent news that Afghan President Hamid Karzai has attempted to negotiate with Taliban leaders, it is important to discuss the failures of U.S. policy in this regard. The leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, was still mulling over whether or not to hand over bin Laden when the U.S. attacked during the Fall of 2001. The Taliban were a nihilistic group, not hell-bent on bin Laden's plans for a global jihad. Omar needed time to decide what was best for his own future, even if it was at the expense of bin Laden, who was an important financial backer of the Taliban.
When Karzai came into power in 2002, he believed bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table was essential to bringing about peace in Afghanistan. He needed to legitimize the Taliban in order to marginalize them. If the Taliban had a stake in the Afghan government, they would not fight against it. But U.S. officials have always exerted a lack of courage and this instance was no different. Instead of worrying about the future of Afghanistan, they worried about their own political fortunes, and rejected Karzai's plan for the Taliban. Instead, the U.S. followed the destructive strategy of backing the warlords. The warlords' livelihoods were dependent on the continuation of the fighting. A chance was missed. Peace would not come to Afghanistan.
Today, the Taliban insurgency is holding its own. They have thus far rejected Karzai's attempts to negotiate. There's no impetus to compromise with Karzai, the insurgency is succeeding and continues to receive funds from Pakistan. The Taliban now profits from the continued fighting. Osama bin Laden has not been captured. The Taliban movement has spread into Pakistan. The Karzai government is weak. These circumstances are as a direct result of the failed policies of the United States towards Afghanistan following the attacks of September 11, 2001.
U.S. policy towards Afghanistan has been utterly haphazard; the U.S. has managed to consistently do the wrong thing in Afghanistan. In addition, prominent members of the administration were so eager to deem Afghanistan a success despite evidence to the contrary and were so anxious to go to war with Iraq. Even now, Republican presidential nominee John McCain explicitly contends that Iraq is the central front of the war on terror.
In the wake of recent news that Afghan President Hamid Karzai has attempted to negotiate with Taliban leaders, it is important to discuss the failures of U.S. policy in this regard. The leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, was still mulling over whether or not to hand over bin Laden when the U.S. attacked during the Fall of 2001. The Taliban were a nihilistic group, not hell-bent on bin Laden's plans for a global jihad. Omar needed time to decide what was best for his own future, even if it was at the expense of bin Laden, who was an important financial backer of the Taliban.
When Karzai came into power in 2002, he believed bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table was essential to bringing about peace in Afghanistan. He needed to legitimize the Taliban in order to marginalize them. If the Taliban had a stake in the Afghan government, they would not fight against it. But U.S. officials have always exerted a lack of courage and this instance was no different. Instead of worrying about the future of Afghanistan, they worried about their own political fortunes, and rejected Karzai's plan for the Taliban. Instead, the U.S. followed the destructive strategy of backing the warlords. The warlords' livelihoods were dependent on the continuation of the fighting. A chance was missed. Peace would not come to Afghanistan.
Today, the Taliban insurgency is holding its own. They have thus far rejected Karzai's attempts to negotiate. There's no impetus to compromise with Karzai, the insurgency is succeeding and continues to receive funds from Pakistan. The Taliban now profits from the continued fighting. Osama bin Laden has not been captured. The Taliban movement has spread into Pakistan. The Karzai government is weak. These circumstances are as a direct result of the failed policies of the United States towards Afghanistan following the attacks of September 11, 2001.
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